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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Before us is an appeal from the order of the District 
Court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction this 
copyright infringement action filed by appellant Raquel. The 
court based its decision on Raquel's failure to show 
registration of its copyright claim in accordance with the 
Copyright Act, which is a prerequisite for the filing of an 




Raquel is a partnership comprising musicians and 
songwriters who authored the music, lyrics, and 
arrangement for an original song entitled "Pop Goes the 
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Music" ("the Song"). Raquel granted defendants 
Elias/Savion Advertising Agency, Inc. ("Elias/Savion") and 
Education Management Corporation ("EMC"), a license to 
use the Song and Raquel's performance for three years in 
a television commercial produced by Elias/Savion that 
advertised the educational programs offered by Art 
Institutes International (an entity operated by EMC). As 
compensation for its license of the Song and its 
performance, Raquel received a separate, full-length music 
video of some four minutes' duration. Like the commercial, 
the video was produced by Elias/Savion. 
 
In July 1995, Raquel, through counsel, filed a federal 
copyright registration form with the Register of Copyrights. 
It identified the nature of the work for which copyright 
registration was sought as an "Audiovisual Work," the title 
of the work as "Pop Goes the Music," and the nature of 
authorship as "All music and lyrics and arrangement." App. 
at 48. Raquel deposited with the application a videotape 
apparently containing both the commercial and the full- 
length music video. 
 
In October 1995, Raquel filed a copyright infringement 
action under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. S 101, in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania against EMC, Geffen Records, and the music 
group Nirvana. Raquel alleged in its complaint that EMC 
violated the licensing agreement by continuing to run the 
commercial beyond the three-year period provided for in the 
agreement and that EMC, acting through Art Institutes 
International, infringed its copyright by entering into an 
agreement with defendants Geffen and Nirvana for the use 
of a portion of the commercial containing the Song"Pop 
Goes the Music" in a music video for Nirvana. EMC then 
filed a third-party complaint against Elias/Savion seeking 
indemnification and/or contribution for any liability it may 
have had toward Raquel. 
 
On motion of Elias/Savion, the District Court dismissed 
the complaint against all defendants for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Raquel v. Education Mgmt. Corp., 955 F. 
Supp. 433 (W.D. Pa. 1996).1 The court noted that in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The complaint, which is not in the appendix, is quoted in the District 
Court's first opinion. See Raquel, 955 F. Supp. at 439. 
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complaint Raquel alleged that the "musical video and TV 
commercial (hereinafter referred to as the `Subject Work'), 
upon being fixed in the tangible medium of a videotape, 
was published by [Raquel] with a notice of copyright on 
February 20, 1991" and that the work "contains material 
wholly original in [Raquel] that is copyrightable subject 
matter." Id. at 439. The court then noted that Raquel had 
registered the copyright as an "audiovisual work" entitled 
"Pop Goes the Music," whereas Mr. Elias of Elias/Savion, 
not Raquel, was the acknowledged author of the 
commercial and music video. Id. at 438. Raquel therefore 
did not have a copyrightable interest in the work that 
formed the basis of its lawsuit because it was undisputed 
that Elias/Savion was the sole author of the audiovisual. 
Id. at 439. The court concluded that because the complaint 
based the infringement claim upon the commercial (in 
which Raquel had no interest) and not upon the musical 
work, it had no subject matter jurisdiction and would grant 
the motion to dismiss. Id. at 440. 
 
The District Court nonetheless denied attorneys fees to 
Elias/Savion. The court, which had previously stated that 
"the term `Audiovisual Work' was inadvertently included," 
id. at 439, stated that Raquel has a "copyrightable interest" 
in the Song, and "did not knowingly fail to advise the 
copyright office of facts which might have led to the 
rejection of its registration application." Id. at 440. 
 
On December 2, 1996, after the dismissal of its first 
complaint, Raquel's counsel filed a supplemental 
registration form with the Copyright Office. This document 
added "performance of song Pop Goes the Music" to the 
description of the nature of the authorship in the earlier 
registration, but made no other changes. App. at 67. On 
December 20, 1996, Raquel, again through counsel, filed 
yet another supplemental registration form. In this form, 
Raquel sought to "amplify" line one of the registration form, 
that describing the "nature of the work," by filing two copies 
of the video of Raquel performing the Song. By way of 
explanation, Raquel stated on the form: "Original filing was 
made with videocassette which contained `Video' of 
RAQUEL performing song, `Pop Goes the Music', and also 
contained other items as to which claimant does not assert 
copyright." App. at 55. 
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The following week, Raquel filed a second copyright 
infringement action against the same defendants who were 
named in the first complaint. The second complaint made 
essentially the same factual allegations, but asserted that 
the copyright that was the subject of the infringement was 
Raquel's copyright in the Song. The defendants moved to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting, 
inter alia, that Raquel's copyright registration was 
insufficient to support jurisdiction for an action alleging 
infringement of its copyright in the Song. 
 
The District Court initially denied the defendants' motion. 
On the defendants' motion for reconsideration, the court, 
approving and adopting a report and recommendation from 
the Magistrate Judge, granted the motion and dismissed 
the case. The District Court's dismissal was based on its 
conclusion that neither Raquel's copyright registration nor 
its supplemental registration was sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction in an action for infringement of the Song. 




The Copyright Act provides: "[N]o action for infringement 
of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until 
registration of the copyright claim has been made in 
accordance with this title." 17 U.S.C. S 411(a). Thus, the 
issue is whether Raquel has met the jurisdictional 
prerequisite for maintaining a copyright infringement 
action, namely a valid registration in the work that has 
allegedly been subject to an infringing use. Our review of 
the District Court's dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is plenary. See Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 9 




We first confront Raquel's argument that the District 
Court erred in failing to adhere to its determination in the 
first lawsuit "that the 1995 Registration was a valid 
registration of the Song." Appellant's Br. at 25. There is 
language in the District Court's 1996 opinion which, 
standing alone, might lead one to conclude that the District 
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Court opined that Raquel did have a registered copyright in 
its Song despite its description of the work as an 
"Audiovisual work." At one point in its opinion, the court 
stated that the inclusion of the term "Audiovisual Work" in 
the application "did not invalidate the copyright of the 
music and lyrics to the song `Pop Goes the Music';" id. at 
439, and at another point stated that Raquel "had a 
copyrightable interest in the [Song];" id. at 440 (emphasis 
added). The District Court stated that the characterization 
as an audiovisual work was inadvertent, and then stated, 
"[A]n innocent omission or inclusion in a registration will 
not invalidate the copyright or render it incapable of 
supporting an infringement action." Id. at 439. However, 
because the District Court dismissed the case for want of 
jurisdiction on the ground that Raquel had only pleaded a 
copyright interest in the commercial and the video, in 
which Raquel had no copyrightable interest, and the case 
before it raised the issue of the validity of the registration 
of the audiovisual work, its statement suggesting that the 
registration was valid vis-a-vis the Song was not necessary 
to the decision and is at most dictum. It did not, therefore, 
bind the District Court in this case, which is a new lawsuit 
with a separate civil action number. Of course, as the first 
dismissal was never appealed to this court, any statement 
or inference raised by the District Court could not bind us. 
 
We note parenthetically that both the magistrate judge 
and the district court judge in this case are, respectively, 
the judges who recommended dismissal and who dismissed 
the first complaint. Consequently, although we appreciate 
why Raquel might have drawn the opposite conclusion, we 
conclude that the issue whether Raquel had a registered 
copyright in the Song was not decided. We turn then to 
that question, which is central to the District Court's 




Although a failure properly to register a work does not 
invalidate the copyright itself, it does preclude the 
maintenance of an infringement action until such time as 
the purported copyright holder obtains a valid registration. 
See Arthur Rutenberg Homes, Inc. v. Drew Homes, Inc., 29 
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F.3d 1529, 1531-32 (11th Cir. 1994); 17 U.S.C. S 411(a); 
Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 2 Nimmer on 
Copyright SS 7.16[A][1], 7.16[B] (1997) [hereinafter Nimmer 
& Nimmer]. 
 
Raquel contends that its initial registration -- in which it 
characterized the nature of the copyrighted work as an 
"Audiovisual Work" -- and its supplemental registration -- 
in which it added description of the nature of the 
authorship -- are sufficient to invoke the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Raquel presses this 
contention on two fronts. First, it urges that its 1995 
registration is sufficient, despite its imprecision, to support 
an infringement action based upon its Song. Second, 
Raquel argues that its performance of the Song is itself a 
copyrightable interest, and that its initial and supplemental 
registration forms together constitute a valid registration 
that would support a lawsuit charging infringement of 
Raquel's copyright in the performance of the Song. We 




Raquel contends that its designation of the nature of its 
work as an "Audiovisual Work" in its copyright registration 
should not bar it from bringing this infringement action for 
infringement of the Song because the designation was 
merely an inadvertent and immaterial error. In pressing 
this argument, Raquel places considerable reliance on our 
decision in Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Industries, 
Inc., 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990). In that case, the plaintiff 
Masquerade, a manufacturer of novelty masks, claimed 
infringement of its copyright in its nose masks (specifically, 
pig, elephant and parrot nose masks). The district court 
granted summary judgment to the defendant, ruling, inter 
alia, that Masquerade had omitted material facts from its 
copyright registration. On appeal, the defendant, a 
competing seller of nose masks, urged that Masquerade did 
not hold valid copyrights because it failed to specify that 
the masks were to be worn by humans. It contended that 
the omitted information would have led the Copyright Office 
to have declined to issue the registrations (apparently on 
the assumption that the Register of Copyrights would have 
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found the masks to be costumes, which are not 
copyrightable). 
 
On appeal, we determined that the supposed omission 
was immaterial because the applications identified the 
articles as "nose masks." In doing so, we acknowledged that 
"[i]t has been consistently held that a plaintiff's knowing 
failure to advise the Copyright Office of [material] facts . . . 
constitutes grounds for holding the registration invalid and 
incapable of supporting an infringement action." Id. at 667. 
However, because we concluded that the omission was not 
a material one, we held it unnecessary to decide"whether 
an inadvertent omission of material information from a 
submission to the Copyright Office renders the copyright 
unenforceable, deprives the copyright owner of itsS 410(c) 
presumption [of validity], or has no legal effect." Id. at 668. 
We nonetheless observed in a footnote that the "view that 
an inadvertent omission from a registration application will 
render a plaintiff's copyright incapable of supporting an 
infringement action has not gained acceptance with the 
courts," and also stated that "[i]t may be that the correct 
approach in situations where there has been a material, 
but inadvertent omission, is to deprive the plaintiff of the 
benefits of S 410(c) [incontestability after five years] and to 
require him to establish the copyrightability of the articles 
he claims are being infringed." Id. at 668 n.5. 
 
Hence, our opinion in Masquerade supports the general 
proposition that an inadvertent and immaterial 
misstatement will not invalidate a copyright registration, a 
proposition on which there is broad consensus in the 
federal courts. See, e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. 
Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1161 (1st Cir. 1994); Eckes v. 
Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1984). 
Less clear, however, is the effect of a misstatement that is 
material but inadvertent. See Data General, 36 F.3d at 
1163 ("No court has suggested that a registration premised 
in part on an unintentional material error would fail to 
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of Section 411(a)."); 
Masquerade, 912 F.2d at 668 & n.5. As our discussion 
below will demonstrate, however, we need not decide that 
question for the purposes of this appeal because, on the 
undisputed record before the court, we cannot conclude 
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that the misstatement was immaterial and unknowingly 
made. 
 
Raquel readily concedes that the designation of the 
nature of its work on its 1995 copyright registration form 
was inaccurate. It urges, however, that the designation of 
the nature of the work as an "Audiovisual Work" was 
immaterial and that in any event it was inadvertent and 
therefore should not bar jurisdiction over this lawsuit. 
 
In determining the materiality of a misstatement in a 
copyright registration, we examine whether the inaccuracy 
might have influenced the Copyright Office's decision to 
issue the registration. See Data General, 36 F.3d at 1161 
("In general, an error is immaterial if its discovery is not 
likely to have led the Copyright Office to refuse the 
application"); Eckes, 736 F.2d at 861-62 (" `[K]nowing 
failure to advise the Copyright Office of facts which might 
have occasioned a rejection of the application constitute[s] 
reason for holding the registration invalid and thus 
incapable of supporting an infringement action' " (quoting 
Russ Berrie & Co., Inc. v. Jerry Elsner Co., Inc., 482 F. 
Supp. 980, 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1980))). 
 
In this case, the registration identifies the work as an 
audiovisual work entitled "Pop Goes the Music," rather than 
the kind of work on which the complaint is based-- a song 
entitled "Pop Goes the Music." The Copyright Act defines 
"Audiovisual works" as "works that consist of a series of 
related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown 
by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, 
viewers, or electronic equipment, together with 
accompanying sounds." 17 U.S.C. S 101. One need have no 
special expertise in intellectual property law to apprehend 
that an audiovisual work is facially very different from a 
song, which would fall under the rubric of "musical works, 
including any accompanying words," 17 U.S.C. S 102(a)(2). 
 
We conclude that this mischaracterization is material. 
Had the Register of Copyrights known that Raquel did not 
author the audiovisual work identified in its registration, it 
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is likely that this rather fundamental misstatement would 
have occasioned the rejection of Raquel's application.2 
 
To be sure, there are numerous cases suggesting that 
many kinds of inadvertent and immaterial errors in 
copyright registration forms will be excused. Courts have 
forgiven plaintiffs for having misidentified the author of a 
work, see, e.g., Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman 
Co., 433 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1970) (listed president of 
corporation instead of corporation); Testa v. Janssen, 492 
F. Supp. 198 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (listed author's assignee), or 
misidentified the owner of the copyright, see Wales Indus. 
v. Hasbro Bradley, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(listing as copyright claimant the exclusive licensee). The 
leading treatises support this view as well. See, e.g., 
Nimmer & Nimmer S 720[B] at 7-208 ("The courts generally 
have been most lenient . . . with respect to any innocent 
error contained in an application for a registration 
certificate."); 1 Paul Goldstein, Copyright S 3.12.3, at 345 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Raquel argues that the Register of Copyrights could not have been 
misled by the registration form because a letter from the Copyright Office 
dated May 14, 1997 shows the Copyright Office understood Raquel's 
1995 registration stated a claim in the "music, lyrics, and arrangement" 
of the Song. However, this letter to Raquel's counsel, sent in response to 
telephone conversations between Raquel's counsel and the examiner who 
signed the letter, was dated nearly two years after the registration was 
filed and does not indicate what the Register of Copyrights would have 
likely done if all of the relevant facts were presented at the time of the 
registration. See App. at 226. In fact, the letter is ambivalent as to the 
nature of Raquel's claim. In the letter, the examiner states, "If your 
client 
owned all rights in the production at the time the original Form PA 
application was filed to register the song, you may . . . ," which 
suggests 
that the Copyright Office was not apprised of the salient fact that Raquel 
had not authored the commercial or video. Moreover, this document is 
not one that may be considered in a motion-to-dismiss setting. Although 
the court may consider, on a motion to dismiss, certain documents that 
are outside the pleadings, such as the registration form and 
supplemental registration forms expressly relied on in the complaint, see 
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997) 
("document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint" may be 
considered when deciding motion to dismiss (quoting Shaw v. Digital 
Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)), this letter is not such 
a document as it is wholly extraneous to the pleadings. 
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(1989) ("Courts have excused innocent errors or omissions 
affecting virtually every material aspect of a copyright 
registration application."). 
 
However, Raquel has not cited, nor have we found, a case 
in which the misstatement to be excused is as fundamental 
as the one in this case. Here, Raquel misidentified the 
nature of the work in such a way as to suggest an 
attempted registration in a work not authored by the 
registrant, namely, the commercial advertisements 
authored, as the parties agree, by Elias/Savion.3 In all of 
the cases excusing immaterial errors the registrant had the 
right to the work described in the registration form. Raquel, 
however, does not have the right to the audiovisual work 
described in the registration form. 
 
Raquel points to Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra, 114 
F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1997), and Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 
734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984), as instances where courts 
have forgiven registrants for misidentifying a work. We find 
both inapposite. Neither involves misidentification of a type 
or degree that is equivalent to that presented in the case at 
bar. In Urantia, the court considered the validity of a 
copyright renewal form in which the applicant referred to 
itself as "the proprietor of a work made for hire" rather 
than, more accurately, "the proprietor of a composite work." 
114 F.3d at 962. The court concluded that the 
misidentification of "a particular type of proprietorship" did 
not affect the validity of the copyright renewal. Id. at 962. 
There was no question as to the fundamental nature of the 
work itself, which was in that case a book believed to have 
been "authored by celestial beings and transcribed, 
complied and collected by mere mortals." Id. at 956. Hence, 
the imprecision excused by the court in Urantia was not, as 
in the present case, one that presented any likelihood of 




3. Raquel relies heavily on the fact that the registration form identified 
the "nature of the authorship" as "all music, lyrics, and arrangements" 
but we find that this characterization of the nature of the authorship 
adds only ambiguity rather than clarity to the registration form. We 
cannot conclude that this ambiguity cures the misstatement as to the 
nature of the work being registered. 
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Nor does the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harris offer 
support for Raquel. In Harris, the court determined, as a 
"subsidiary issue[ ]," that a registration form incorrectly 
identifying singer Emmylou Harris as the author of a work 
did not bar Harris's infringement suit where subsequent 
transfers resulted in Harris's ownership of the copyright 
before suit was instituted and the defendant showed no 
prejudice from the misidentification of the author. 734 F.2d 
at 1335. Thus, Harris, like Urantia, did not involve a 
registration form that purported to register a copyright in a 
work other than the one on which the infringement suit 
was based. 
 
Consequently, despite the generally accommodating 
stance taken where the misstatement in the registration 
form does not go to the nature of the work for which 
protection is sought, we find in this case a serious 
imprecision in identifying the work itself. A copyright 
registration that misidentifies the nature of a copyrighted 
work fails to give proper notice to the Register of Copyrights 
regarding the nature of the intellectual property for which 
protection is sought. As a result, it is not unreasonable to 




We also cannot find on this record that the misstatement 
in the registration form was an innocent error. Defendants 
argue, and we agree, that there is no record evidence that 
the misstatement was inadvertent. It would be difficult to 
draw the inference of inadvertence from this record. 
Counsel for Raquel (who is not counsel in this appeal) 
executed the registration form on Raquel's behalf on July 
18, 1995, denoting the nature of the work as an 
"Audiovisual Work." The same attorney thenfiled the first 
infringement action on October 11, 1995, identifying the 
work forming the basis of Raquel's infringement claim as 
the commercial and the video, both clearly audiovisual 
works. See Raquel, 955 F. Supp. at 440. It is difficult to 
conclude that an attorney who executed a registration form 
for an "Audiovisual Work" and then proceeded to file a 
complaint alleging that the defendants infringed Raquel's 
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copyright in audiovisual works intended the copyright to 
cover the Song. 
 
Furthermore, as the complaint alleges, the Song was 
authored in 1990, although the video and commercials 
were created in 1991. The registration form identifies the 
year in which creation of the work was completed as 1991, 
the year in which the video and commercials were 
produced, which further suggests that the work for which 
registration was sought in 1995 was the video and 
commercials, as the registration form itself indicated, rather 
than the Song itself. Nor did Raquel, after the dismissal of 
its first suit, file a new copyright registration form that 
correctly identified the nature of the work for which it 
sought copyright as a musical work or song before 
instituting an infringement action based upon the Song. 
 
Based on the information on record, we cannot conclude 
that the inaccuracy in Raquel's 1995 registration was either 
immaterial or inadvertent. Raquel filed a registration form 
suggesting authorship of an audiovisual work in which it 
had no copyrightable interest. Although we need not go as 
far as did the court in Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume 
Co., 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989), which labeled as "fraud 
on the Copyright Office" a registration for what proved to be 
plaintiff's Halloween costumes (which are not entitled to 
copyright protection) which plaintiff had described on its 
application as "soft sculptures" (which are entitled to 
copyright protection),4 the fact remains that Raquel filed a 
registration form suggesting authorship of an audiovisual 
work in which it had no copyrightable interest. There is a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. On a subsequent Rule 60(b)(3) motion, the District Court in 
Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Company, 836 F. Supp. 112 
(E.D.N.Y. 1993), considered an affidavit by the section head of the 
Copyright Office in which he stated that the "description of the works as 
a soft sculpture did not and does not constitute a representation to the 
Copyright Office that the works in question have no useful function [the 
issue in that case]." Id. at 115. Based on that affidavit, the court 
reversed its earlier position and held the Copyright Office had not been 
misled. The letter from a copyright examiner submitted by Raquel in this 
case as part of its objections to the magistrate judge's initial report 
and 
recommendation, see note 2 supra, is not comparable to the affidavit 
submitted in Whimsicality. 
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fundamental difference between an audiovisual work and a 
song. We conclude therefore that the 1995 copyright 
registration could not serve as the jurisdictional basis for 
this suit notwithstanding that this complaint, unlike the 




Raquel's second argument is that it has, by means of its 
supplemental registration, a registered copyright in 
Raquel's performance sufficient to invoke the court's 
subject matter jurisdiction on a claim that the defendants 
infringed its copyright in that performance. 
 
There is no doubt that one can have a copyrightable 
interest in a particular performance of a song. See, e.g., 
Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1995) 
("[P]erformances include television broadcasts of the Song 
as captured in movies and television programs and radio 
broadcasts of the Song as captured in sound recordings."); 
Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The 
distinction may be summed up as the difference between a 
copyright in a Cole Porter song and a copyright in Frank 
Sinatra's performance of that song. The former would be a 
musical work copyright and the latter would be a sound 
recording copyright, although both may be embodied in the 
same phonorecord." (quoting 1 M. Nimmer, Copyright 
S 4.06, p. 4-34 n.1)). However, once again Raquel founders 
because it has not demonstrated that it has registered a 
copyright in its performance so as to satisfy the 
jurisdictional requirement of 17 U.S.C. S 411(a). 
 
Raquel's interest in its performance was not decided in 
the first action. The court did note that Raquel had not 
applied for nor received a copyright of its performance of 
the Song and stated that it would make no determination 
regarding Raquel's right to copyright its performance. 
Raquel, 955 F. Supp. at 440. Assuming that Raquel has a 
copyrightable interest in the performance of the Song as 
captured on the video, we must decide whether Raquel's 
supplemental registration is sufficient to register a 
copyright in the performance, when the initial registration 
was for an "Audiovisual Work," and, if so, whether Raquel's 
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complaint has alleged an infringement of its performance of 
its Song. 
 
Raquel's attempt to use its supplemental registration as 
a basis for asserting a claim that the defendants infringed 
its copyright in its performance rests on an erroneous 
understanding of the function of supplemental registration. 
The applicable regulation governing supplementary 
registration states: 
 
       (2) Supplementary registration may be made either to 
       correct or to amplify the information in a basic 
       registration. For the purposes of this section: 
 
       (i) A "correction" is appropriate if informa tion in the 
       basic registration was incorrect at the time that basic 
       registration was made, and the error is not one that 
       the Copyright Office itself should have recognized; 
 
       (ii) An amplification is appropriate: 
 
        (A) To supplement or clarify the information t hat 
       was required by the application for the basic 
       registration and should have been provided, such 
       as the identity of a co-author or co-claimant, but 
       was omitted at the time the basic registration was 
       made, or 
 
        (B) To reflect changes in facts, other than those 
       relating to transfer, license, or ownership of rights 
       in the work, that have occurred since the basic 
       registration was made. 
 
       (iii) Supplementary registration is not appropriat e: 
 
        (A) As an amplification, to reflect a chan ge in 
       ownership that occurred on or after the effective 
       date of the basic registration or to reflect the 
       division, allocation, licensing or transfer of rights 
       in a work; or 
 
        (B) To correct errors in statements or notices  on 
       the copies of phonorecords of a work, or to reflect 
       changes in the content of a work[.] 
 
37 C.F.R. S 201.5(b). 
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Raquel's effort to use its supplementary registration to 
change the nature of the work as set forth in its original 
registration does not neatly fit into the concepts of 
"correction" or "amplification" as used in the regulation. By 
filing the supplemental registration, Raquel did not seek to 
cure "incorrect information" in the initial registration, 
"supplement or clarify" omitted information, or "reflect 
changes in facts." Rather, by means of the supplemental 
registration, Raquel sought to change the nature of the 
work for which a copyright is claimed. This attempt is more 
akin to the prohibited use of supplemental registration set 
forth in S 201.5(b)(2)(iii)(B), viz., "to reflect changes in the 
content of a work." 
 
What Raquel urges is essentially that the supplemental 
registration should supersede the original registration. That 
is, rather than the "audiovisual work" for which it had 
registered a copyright, Raquel sought to copyright a 
"performance" through its supplemental registration. That 
such a use of the supplemental registration process is at 
odds with the intent of the regulation is underscored by the 
statutory provision enabling the regulation, 17 U.S.C. 
S 408(d). That section permits the promulgation of 
regulations allowing authors to use supplemental 
registration "to correct an error in a copyright registration 
or to amplify the information given in a registration" but 
clearly states: "The information contained in a 
supplementary registration augments but does not 
supersede that contained in the earlier registration." 
 
Moreover, even if we were to assume arguendo that 
Raquel's supplemental registration is a sufficient ground for 
jurisdiction in an action for infringement of its putative 
copyright in the performance of the Song, Raquel's 
argument is undone by the wording of its complaint. 
Determination whether an action arises under federal 
copyright law is made by reference to the statement of the 
claim in the complaint. See Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 
Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988). "Where there is 
a fatal flaw on the face of a complaint that purports to 
assert an infringement action, the suit should be dismissed 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 1382. 
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Raquel's complaint is barren of any allegation of an 
infringement of a copyright in Raquel's performance of the 
Song. To the contrary, the complaint alleges infringement of 
the Song itself, in which, as we here hold, Raquel has not 
registered a copyright. In paragraph 13 Raquel states that 
it "created the music, lyrics and arrangements for an 
original composition entitled `Pop Goes the Music' 
(hereinafter `Plaintiff's Work')." App. at 14. In paragraph 44, 
Raquel refers to the use of the "Plaintiff's Work" by EMC in 
advertising after the end of the three year period of the 
licensing agreement without permission from Raquel 
thereby infringing upon its copyright. App. at 20. Raquel 
states in Paragraph 53 that defendants, by virtue of 
entering into a "Videoshow Agreement" with Geffen and 
Nirvana, committed a further act of infringement of 
"Plaintiff's Work." App. at 22. 
 
In short, throughout the counts of the complaint, Raquel 
alleges infringement of "Plaintiff's Work," which paragraph 
13 defines as the music, lyrics, and arrangements of its 
Song, not its performance. Although the complaint includes 
among its factual allegations the averment that Raquel is 
the sole proprietor of the Song "and Plaintiff's performance 
of the song in an audiovisual work," App. at 18, no count 
of the complaint alleges a violation of that interest. Hence, 
even on a charitable reading of the complaint, it is not 
possible to construe it as alleging an infringement of 
Raquel's performance as distinct from its Song. Nor could 
it amend to so allege, as it has failed to perfect a copyright 




We conclude that Raquel does not have a registered 
copyright in either its Song or the performance of its Song 
that would entitle it to bring suit. Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court's dismissal of this action for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I believe that the majority's decision elevates form over 
substance and works a forfeiture of a valid copyright 
because of a misstatement that the trial court had already 
labeled inadvertent. I dissent for two reasons. First, the 
majority ignores the prior findings and holding of the 
District Court regarding the validity of Raquel's copyright in 
its song "Pop Goes the Music." These determinations were 
clearly the law of the case and entitled to deference. 
Second, as a matter of substantive law, Raquel's 
registration should not be deemed invalid merely because of 
an inadvertent mistake which caused no prejudice to the 
defendants in this action. There is no evidence in the record 
that compels a finding of fraudulent intent, and the 
majority's resolution of factually ambiguous issues against 
Raquel is inappropriate in the context of a motion to 




The District Court's initial determination that Raquel's 
1995 registration was a valid registration of the song was 
clearly the law of the case, and the District Court's failure, 
without explanation, to adhere to its earlier determination 
unfairly prejudiced Raquel and was in error. The majority 
compounds this error by itself disregarding this preclusive 
finding. 
 
The District Court, in its 1996 judgment, made clear and 
specific findings and concluded that Raquel had validly 
registered its copyright in the music and lyrics of the song. 
Because Raquel identified the title of the work as"Pop Goes 
the Music" and the nature of authorship as "[a]ll music & 
lyrics & arrangement," the District Court found that "it is 
sufficiently clear that Raquel intended to obtain a copyright 
in its song, `Pop Goes the Music.' " Raquel v. Education 
Mgmt. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 433, 439 (W.D. Pa. 1996). 
Although the Registration incorrectly described the nature 
of the work as an "Audiovisual Work," the court explicitly 
held that "the term `Audiovisual Work' was inadvertently 
included in the copyright application and, as a 
consequence, it did not invalidate the copyright of the music 
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and lyrics to the song, `Pop Goes the Music.' " Id. (emphasis 
added). The District Court went on to hold that"because 
Raquel had a copyrightable interest in the song`Pop Goes 
the Music' it did not knowingly fail to advise the copyright 
office of facts which might have led to the rejection of the 
registration application." Id. at 440. Although the District 
Court proceeded to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, 
this was simply because Raquel's complaint referred only to 
the full-length music video (in which it held no copyright), 
and not to the song itself (in which it clearly did). See id. 
Indeed, as the District Court noted in its Order of January 
20, 1998: 
 
       [t]he previous dismissal . . . [was] not based upon a 
       finding that plaintiff's Certificate of Copyright 
       Registration was invalid; to the contrary, Magistrate 
       Judge Caiazza, as approved by this Court, found that 
       certificate to be valid, despite some inadvertent errors 
       in plaintiff's application. The dismissal was, rather, 
       based upon plaintiff's failure to allege in the complaint 
       any infringement of the copyrighted song, as opposed 
       to the audiovisual material containing the song which 
       plaintiff had not copyrighted." 
 
App. 230 (emphasis in original). The District Court thus 
made three important rulings in the 1996 action, which 
became the law of the case: (1) that Raquel had intended to 
register its copyright in the song and not in the video; (2) 
that the inclusion of the term "Audiovisual Work" in the 
registration was merely inadvertent; and (3) that therefore, 
the registration was valid as to the music and lyrics of the 
song, if not to the video itself. 
 
The majority attempts to brush aside these clear and 
binding determinations by characterizing them as"at most 
dictum." However, the District Court's findings in regard to 
the copyrights of the music and lyrics were essential to an 
important part of its judgment on the merits -- its denial of 
Elias/Savon's motion for attorney's fees. Elias/Savon had 
claimed that "an award of attorney's fees is appropriate . . . 
since the Plaintiff and its counsel had full knowledge of the 
falsity of the statement made to the copyright office at the 
time the copyright registration was filed." Raquel, 955 F. 
Supp. at 437. The Court was thus required to make a 
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concrete finding on the inadvertence issue -- with which 
the issue of the copyright's validity was inextricably 
intertwined -- as a predicate to resolving the attorney's fees 
question. Significantly, the defendants never appealed the 
Court's denial of attorney's fees, or its predicatefindings on 
inadvertence and validity. 
 
The law of the case doctrine " `expresses the practice of 
courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been 
decided.' " Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 
1997) (quoting Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 
(1912)). Law of the case restrictions apply to "subsequent 
rulings by the same judge in the same case or a closely 
related one." Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania, 14 F.3d 848, 856 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Although a trial judge has the power to reconsider an 
earlier decision, its authority to do so is limited by two 
prudential considerations: "First, the court must explain on 
the record the reasoning behind its decision to reconsider 
the prior ruling. Second, the court must take appropriate 
steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on 
the prior ruling." Williams, 130 F.3d at 573. 
 
In the present case, neither the District Court's Order nor 
the Magistrate Judge's report presents any explanation of 
the decision to ignore the District Court's earlierfinding 
that the registration was valid. Moreover, Raquel was 
clearly prejudiced by the court's abrupt and unanticipated 
about-face on this question. After the District Court 
dismissed the first action without prejudice, Raquel read 
the Court's decision as any reasonable plaintiff would -- 
that although its complaint had been defective, it 
nevertheless had a valid registered copyright in the song.1 
In reliance on the District Court's holding, itfiled a new 
complaint which cured the pleading defects identified by 
the Court, but failed to reexamine the certificate of 
registration, which the Court had already determined was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Even the majority concedes that "[t]here is language in the District 
Court's 1996 opinion which, standing alone, might lead one to conclude 
that the District Court opined that Raquel did have a registered 
copyright in its Song despite its description of the work as an 
`Audiovisual work.' " 
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capable of supporting an infringement claim based on the 
song. It was not until the District Court's reconsideration of 
the defendant's motion to dismiss in the second action that 
Raquel had any indication that the Court's earlier ruling 
was not what it seemed to be. However, by this point, the 
District Court had dismissed Racquel's claims with 
prejudice. 
 
Absent the District Court's assurances on the matter, 
Raquel could have filed a supplementary registration under 
17 U.S.C. S 408(d) in order to perfect its registered 
copyright in the song. Because the District Court, by its 
earlier ruling and expression, did not alert Raquel to its 
concern about the validity of the copyright in the song, 
Raquel was undeniably prejudiced. See Williams, 130 F.3d 
at 573. The District Court was thus foreclosed from 
revisiting its earlier, unambiguous ruling that Raquel had 
validly registered its copyright in the song's music and 
lyrics. 
 
Collateral estoppel principles would also support this 
conclusion. The collateral estoppel doctrine prevents the 
relitigation of issues that have been decided in a previous 
action. Under the law of this Circuit, four factors must be 
met before the application of collateral estoppel is 
appropriate: (1) the previous determination was necessary 
to the decision; (2) the identical issue was previously 
litigated; (3) the issue was actually decided in a decision 
that was final, valid, and on the merits; and (4) the party 
being precluded from relitigating the issue was adequately 
represented in the previous action. See Hawksbill Sea 
Turtle v. Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461, 
475 (3d Cir. 1997). In the present case, the District Court 
made explicit findings as to inadvertence and validity in its 
decision dismissing the earlier action and refusing 
Elias/Savon's motion for attorney's fees. Defendants are 
thus precluded from relitigating these issues, and the 




Even if the validity of the registration had not been 
foreclosed by the District Court's earlier ruling, Raquel's 
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registration was clearly sufficient, as a substantive matter, 
to perfect its copyright interest in the music and lyrics of 
the song. 
 
"The case law is overwhelming that inadvertent mistakes 
on registration certificates do not . . . bar infringement 
actions, unless the alleged infringer has relied to its 
detriment on the mistake, or the claimant intended to 
defraud the Copyright Office by making the misstatement." 
Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 
1997).2 See also Masquerade Novelty v. Unique Indus., Inc., 
912 F.2d 662, 668 n.5 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Unique's view that 
an inadvertent omission from a registration application will 
render a plaintiff's copyright incapable of supporting an 
infringement action has not gained acceptance with the 
courts."); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 
36 F.3d 1147, 1161-62 (1st Cir. 1994) ("It is well 
established that immaterial, inadvertent, errors in an 
application for copyright registration do not jeopardize the 
validity of the registration."); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 
736 F.2d 859, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Only the `knowing 
failure to advise the Copyright Office of facts which might 
have occasioned a rejection of the application constitute[s] 
reason for holding the registration invalid' ") (quoting Russ 
Berrie & Co., Inc. v. Jerry Elsner Co., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 
980, 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)); 2 Melville B. Nimmer & David 
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright S 7.20[B] at 7-208 ("a 
misstatement . . . in the registration certificate, if 
unaccompanied by fraud, should neither invalidate the 
copyright nor render the registration certificate incapable of 
supporting an infringement action"). 
 
The majority attempts to distinguish this long line of 
cases by pointing to the fact that Raquel's registration 
misidentified the nature of the work in question. This 
argument mischaracterizes the case law. No court of 
appeals has ever suggested that an inadvertent error in a 
registration statement -- even an error as to the nature of 
the work -- can bar an infringement action where the work 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the majority attempts to distinguish Urantia on its facts, the 
rule announced in Urantia -- and seemingly not disputed by the majority 
-- clearly covers the facts of the case at bar. 
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would have been copyrightable had the registration 
statement contained a correct statement of facts. See 
Masquerade Novelty, 912 F.2d at 668 n.5.3 See also 2 
Nimmer & Nimmer S 7.20[B] at 7-208 n.19 (collecting 
cases). Indeed, in Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 173 F.2d 288 (2d 
Cir. 1949), the Second Circuit dealt with precisely the issue 
of misidentification of the nature of a copyrighted work in 
its registration. In Feist, the plaintiff's registration 
certificate referred only to the arrangement of the subject 
song. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that the 
registration was sufficient to maintain an action based on 
infringement of the song's melody because there was no 
contention that the defendants were "misled by the 
certificate of registration." Id. at 290. 
 
In the present case, there is no dispute that Raquel's 
interest in the music and lyrics to the song were 
copyrightable, or that the registration would have been 
valid had it correctly stated the nature of the subject work. 
Nor is there any intimation that the defendants were at all 
prejudiced by the error in the registration. Clearly, the 
defendants in this suit, like those in Feist, were not misled 
by the registration as to the scope of the protected work. In 
light of these considerations, Raquel's inadvertent error 





The majority attempts to bolster its holding by making its 
own factual finding that Raquel committed a fraud on the 
Copyright Office. It grounds this argument in its assertion 
that "[i]t is difficult to conclude that an attorney who 
executed a registration form for an `Audiovisual Work' and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In dictum, the Masquerade Novelty Court did suggest that "[i]t may be 
that the correct approach in situations where there has been a material, 
but inadvertent omission, is to deprive the plaintiff of the benefits of 
S 410(c) and to require him to establish the copyrightability of the 
articles he claims are being infringed." 912 F.2d at 688 n.5. Even under 
this somewhat more stringent standard, Raquel would be entitled to 
reversal of the District Court's dismissal and an opportunity to prove 
copyrightability before that court. 
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then proceeded to file a complaint alleging that the 
defendants infringed Raquel's copyright in audiovisual 
works intended the copyright to cover the song." 4 
 
I believe that the majority, in focusing singularly on the 
use of the term "Audiovisual Work," has ignored the array 
of evidence in the record that supports a finding of 
inadvertence. In its 1995 copyright application, Raquel 
properly identified the title of the work as "Pop Goes The 
Music" -- not as "Before the Crowd Roars," the title of the 
commercial. App. 48. In the same application, Raquel 
identified the nature of its authorship as "[a]ll music & 
lyrics & arrangements" -- a clear indication of its intent to 
register the song and not the video. App. 48, 50. Moreover, 
Raquel's copyright counsel, Edward C. Terreri, stated under 
oath that the copyright application was filed in good faith 
"with no intent to seek any greater rights for RAQUEL than 
those to which RAQUEL is entitled," Raquel, 955 F. Supp. 
433, 439 n.1 (quoting Terreri Declaration), and that he "had 
no intent to defraud the Copyright Office . . . or anyone else 
in connection with attempts to obtain copyright protection 
for Raquel." App. 186. These facts led the District Court 
itself to hold (in my opinion correctly) that the inclusion of 
the term "Audiovisual Work" was merely an inadvertent 
error. See Part I, supra. 
 
The fragments of evidence that the majority does 
assemble do not support, much less compel, a finding of 
advertence or fraudulent intent.5 The mere inclusion of the 
term "audiovisual work" in the registration and original 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The majority's reference to Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 
891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989) is inapposite. First, Whimsicality concerned 
a motion for summary judgement, not a motion to dismiss. A factual 
finding of fraudulent intent is simply inappropriate at the pleadings 
stage. Moreover, the judgment of the Whimsicality court was later 
vacated in light of an affidavit from the Copyright Office stating that it 
had not, in fact, been misled by Whimsicality's registration statement. 
See Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 112 
(E.D.N.Y. 1993). Indeed, the facts of the Whimsicality case should serve 
to caution this Court against making hasty findings of bad faith before 
the record below has been fully established. 
 
5. The majority claims that it need not go so far as to find "fraud on the 
Copyright Office" in order to nullify Raquel's copyright. This is a 
distinction without a difference: the majority's findings of advertence 
and 
materiality are, in substance, a finding of fraud. See Whimsicality, Inc. 
v. 
Rubie's Costume Co., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 112, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("two 
elements are required to find [copyright fraud]: an intent to mislead and 
behavior which would be objectively likely to mislead"). 
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complaint may simply indicate a confusion on the part of 
counsel arising from the fact that the song Raquel intended 
to copyright was fixed on the soundtrack of a videotape.6 
Raquel's failure to amend the registration as to the nature 
of the work similarly evinces no fraudulent intent, but 
merely a reasonable reliance on the District Court's 1996 
holding that it had already validly registered its copyright in 
the music and lyrics of the song. In any event, the 
majority's resolution of the factually ambiguous question of 
advertence against Raquel at the pleading stage violates the 
basic principle that, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, 
the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, and all well-pleaded factual allegations taken 




For these reasons, I would conclude that Raquel does 
have a registered copyright in the song "Pop Goes the 
Music" that entitles it to bring suit, and I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Raquel's copyright counsel Edward C. Terreri stated under oath that 
"I described the media on which Raquel performed the Song as 
`audiovisual' because that seemed logical and also that decision was 
concurred in by a specialist in the Copyright Office with whom I 
communicated." App. 187-88 (emphasis added). 
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